Essay extract: If there was evidence that Iran had developed Nuclear Weapons, what should the US do?

I wrote the majority of this in November 2011. PLease comment.

     In answer to what should the US should do if it was confirmed that Iran had developed nuclear weapons; the US should ‘seize and restrict’ Iran’s nuclear, programme, weapons, and production facilities. This can be completed ether through diplomatic or more likely, militaristic means. Graham Allison provides a suitable course of analysis in his Rational Actor Model, by explaining “international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments” (Allison: 1971) will help justify such a strong course of action from the US. This essay will create three possible scenarios that may develop as a result of Iranian nuclear armament.

•   Scenario one: Iran will use its new nuclear capabilities to increase its regional power in the Middle East, whilst also deterring possible Israeli aggression.   
•  Scenario two: Iran will use its WMD programme to strengthen its strategic role in the straits of Hormuz.  
•  Scenario three: Iran will use its connection to terrorist networks to deploy its nuclear weapons in a series of proxy attacks against Iranian enemies.

        Each scenario will be assessed through their consequential value and payoff to Iran’s overall strategy. By analysing the potential consequences and alternatives this essay will reach a choice by selection the scenario which best supports/represents the states goals and objectives of the Iranian government. Certain questions must be answered in each scenario; what the Iranian government’s objectives are, how Tehran will fulfil its operational criteria, and what the consequences are? By following the Rational Actor Model this essay will reach a hypothesis in each scenario, and then select the scenario that is most plausible. The hypothesis of each scenario will be made by a series of assumptions, “Assumes that what must be explained is an action, i.e., behaviour that reflects purpose or intention/ assumes that the actor is a national government./ assumes that the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic problem / each, explanation consists of showing what goal the government was pursuing when it acted and how the action was a reasonable choice, given the nations objective” (Allison: 1971)

The threat that an Iran with nuclear capabilities poses to both the US and the world is substantial. The Rational Actor Model supports that a dominant threat comes from the Iranian political leaders/government, the two main players in the political matrix are President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and to a lesser extent, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. The roles and personalities of these individuals are important in the analysis of the scenarios. For example President Ahmadinejad is prone to wild, extravagant claims and political manoeuvres, suggesting that once armed with nuclear weapons he will be more prone to deploying them as a tactical weapon.

Questions that need to be answered are, why has Tehran wanted to gain nuclear status and what does President Ahmadinejad wish to achieve by gaining nuclear weapons? It could be argued that Iran seeks to gain international recognition for its dubious regime, the WMD’s (weapons of mass destruction) acting as a status symbol.  However Alan Collins points out that “WMD provide a way to offset their inferiority in conventional armaments compared to stronger regional rivals or the United States.” (Collins: 2007) Therefore it is appropriate to assume that Iran feels threatened by the United States and actively seeks nuclear armament as a way of checking US influence in the Persian Gulf.

It is also suitable to suggest that an Iran in procession of indigenously made WMD’s would utilise them, this premise is particularly important, as all three scenarios rely on the assertion that Iran will utilise its nuclear capabilities strategically. This conclusion has been made through analysis of the economic situation that Iran finds itself in and the allocation of its partial resources to fund its defence policies. The Iranian defence budget has been under a huge amount of internal and international constraint, “stemming from the poor state of its economy and the embargo on military sales to it by all of the Western States.” (Sokolky: 2004) Therefore by analysing what Iran has spent its stringent budget on, we can evaluate what the government in Tehran value as a tactical imperative.

 Iran has allocated its limited resources in two major areas, firstly in air and sea denial, demonstrated through the purchase of “CSS-2 Silkworm and CSS-3 Seersucker surface-launched anti-ship missiles/ MIG-29 fighter, Su-24 attack aircraft.” (Sokolky: 2004) These purchases will support the hypothesis demonstrated in scenario two, that Iran seeks to gain greater control of the Straits of Hormuz, using its nuclear capabilities to deter western interference, whilst utilising its anti air and sea capabilities to deny the flow of commerce, in particular oil; thus gaining control of Western economies that widely depend on the flow of commodities through this region. Secondly, Iran has made huge steps in its WMD projects, most notably in the deployment and weaponization of nuclear materials, the launch and testing of Iran’s medium (Shahab-3) and intermediate range (Shahab-4) missiles , demonstrates that Iran has the capabilities to strike regionally and even beyond the Middle East. This conclusion will support the hypothesis of scenario one, that Iran seeks to increase its regional power, by using its nuclear capabilities to deter possible Israeli aggression, whilst also placing strategic leverage on possible regional allies “there can be no capacity for the use of force that does not evoke some response from those who hope it might be used on their behalf, or from those who fear it might be used against them.” (Luttwak: 2003) As it has been previously stated, Iran has limited access to strategic resources outside of its indigenous capabilities; therefore it is appropriate to assume that because Iran has placed so much of its constrained military budget into the acquisition of anti air/sea technology and in its WMD project we can assume that the use of both are written in Iranian strategy. This legitimises the credibility of all three scenarios, including scenario three which may at first appear extreme; is supported by looking at the previous actions of the Iranian government and Tehran’s links to Islamic terrorist networks.